Founder’s DAO Improvement Proposal - Gnosis Safe Signers

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Founder’s DAO Improvement Proposal - Gnosis Safe Signers

Author: Jacob Wittman (@jakewittman)
Co-Authors: @RustySailor_
Type: Governance
Implementor: Pixel Vault, Inc.; Founder’s DAO Community Members
Created Date: March 7, 2022

Summary

The Founder’s DAO assets are currently held in the following wallet address: 0x580a96bc816c2324bdff5eb2a7e159ae7ee63022 (the “Founder’s DAO Wallet”). While the snapshot.page vote serves as a mechanism for the Founder’s DAO to exercise their voice, no action will be taken until the keyholder to the Founder’s DAO Wallet acts. Currently, the Founder’s DAO wallet is managed via a Gnosis Safe, which has three keyholders. At least two signatories must sign for any action in the Founder’s DAO Wallet to be completed on-chain.

The current Gnosis Safe keyholders are Sean Gearin, the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Pixel Vault, Inc. (“Pixel Vault”), Chuba, Lead Solidity Developer at Pixel Vault and Andy8052, Founder of Fractional.art. This proposal seeks to expand the number of signatories from three (3) to seven (7) and appoint four (4) new signers to serve as the additional signatories.

Newly Elected Signatories

We’ve spent a lot of time thinking about who should serve these roles, and what the requirements (if any) should be. We landed on three minimums that each keyholder should have:

  1. Own at least one PVFD Token
  2. Be an active member of the Founder’s DAO Discord
  3. Have a proposal ready to submit to the Founder’s DAO for debate

Number 3 above might seem a bit unnatural as a “requirement,” but something that we are inspired to see in the Founder’s DAO is a level of civil discourse and debate that not many other DAOs reach. As an already engaged community on Discord, the opportunity for continued growth is limitless; however, to sustain that growth each level of the DAO (from community to keyholders) should be engaged in finding new ways to innovate and operate.

After discussing with various members of the Founder’s DAO community (s/o to Rusty, Potamus and others for the help here), we landed on the following individuals to discuss this opportunity with:

  1. Richard [MetaHero No. 5], member of the Founder’s DAO
  2. RustySailor, members of the Founder’s DAO
  3. SpaceWalk.eth, member of the Founder’s DAO
  4. Jacob Wittman, member of the Founder’s DAO; General Counsel, Pixel Vault

Each of the individuals above has expressed an immense amount of support for the Founder’s DAO and is thrilled to be proposed signers on the Founder’s DAO multisig.

Staggered Voting; Fees

The current process of using a Gnosis Safe and requiring an m-of-n vote will likely transition to a full on-chain vote and the Gnosis Safe will no longer be needed. However, to ensure fair mechanics and protect against a backdrop where the transition to on-chain is delayed, we propose that the keyholders serve one (1) year terms. These terms will be staggered, with one keyholder rotating out every 3 months. The first rotation will be scheduled six (6) months from the passing of this proposal, which will result in certain individuals serving longer than 1 year, but allows for the staggered process to be implemented.

This FDIP proposes the following rotation for the keyholders:

  1. Chuba to serve until September 7, 2022, at which point in time the Founder’s DAO will vote a new keyholder in his place.
  2. Jacob Wittman - December 1, 2022
  3. Sean Gearin - March 1, 2023
  4. Andy8052 - June 1, 2023
  5. RustySailor - September 1, 2023
  6. SpaceWalk.eth - December 1, 2023
  7. Richard [MetaHero No. 5] - March 1, 2024

Furthermore, we propose that each keyholder shall be eligible to receive 0.3 ETH from the Founder’s DAO to help cover time and costs associated with the management of the Gnosis Safe. This distribution will come later after the Founder’s DAO has considered various liquidity opportunities.

[End of proposal]

2 Likes
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The Snapshot page for voting on this proposal can be found here: Snapshot

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Thanks for this!

Im a bit confused on how many are in the “trust” at once. Is it always 7 people, each holding a key, with a Gnosis sig of 3 of 7? Or do they rotate holding the keys? Also, once your 1 year is served, you cant become keyholder again (or this just wont be a need for keyholders because we will have onchain voting)?

I dont particularly like #3 (as you mentioned). I think there could be quality issues and I think you are looking more for active participation then simply, did you submit a proposal. What if there was a Discord or Forum user score (not sure if that is a thing) that would serve as a metric showing your activity and engagement.

Cheers!!!

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Hi WCW! It would be 7 signers at all times (4 of 7 needed to approve any tx), with one signer rotating every 3 months. I think that person could probably be nominated to serve in the same role; however, my goal here was to get new participants in the gnosis. Since we are currently working on-chain voting, this may not even be an issue as we move away from the Gnosis.

Appreciate the feedback!

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Gotcha! That makes sense. I like the idea of the signers serving 1 year and then they would have to be re-elected (and not just put back into the rotation). But like you said, this might now ever been an issue because we will have on-chain voting eventually.

Im good with all of your recommended key holders. Great, active people.

Id just like to see your #3 point re-evaluated.

Nice work and thank you!

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Great Job to everyone involved in setting this up. I can’t wait to see where we go with this!

There are a couple additional items I think we should address in this proposal. It’s unlikely that any of the chosen representatives are bad actors but, I think we should have some plan in place. These are just some ideas I am spitballing:

  • Require a keyholders to lock their founders dao token for duration of their term. This is to prevent someone from getting elected then selling their founders dao token. I’m not sure how to implement this technically or how to handle edge cases.
  • Have a method or plan to handle a situation where a keyholder is voted out of their position or voluntarily steps down.
  • Payout the .3 eth at the end of the keyholders term. This is to keep this reward only to those that serve a full term. I don’t think it is unreasonable to increase this amount since it will not be received until the end of the term. I also think we should raise this amount proportionally for Richard, SpaceWalk, Rusty, and Andy who will be serving longer than 1 year terms to start.
5 Likes
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Love the input!
1/ if this is an easy tech implementation, then makes total sense.
2/ I think this would just require a new vote for a new signer-which we have to do when a signer finished their term.
3/ Agree with doing payout as a reimbursement at end of term.

We will only be in this multi-sig state for a year or two - I think? Then we will move to onchain voting.

1 Like
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Is anyone able to explain the onchain voting mechanics? Let’s say a proposal passes, what then triggers the next event? If someone proposes to give away all planets for example, and it passes, how does that play out? I also agree with what @Themotto.eth stated but with that said, this proposal would need to pass, then an additional proposal to amend and existing rule would be created?

1 Like
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should there be a higher minimum amount of fdaos to do this? apparently space owns just 1, richard 2. these are pretty high positions where just 7 people account for all the founders holders wallet (just 4 needed to activate the wallet to do stuff).

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Fair point - But I think there is another side of this that is positive. Which is, you dont need to be a whale to be a keyholder. I also think their “social capital” is very much put up as collateral for this position.

1 Like
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I don’t think number of FD’s owned should matters to be a keyholder. Someone with 1 FD committed to a long term time horizon is a better rep than someone with 10 who plans to sell off over time. Activity + Trust should be the main criteria in my opinion.

1 Like
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I agree, number of tokens should not have a minimum.
But I would add that current Keyholders should not be able to suggest new keyholders to minimise the risk.
Also if someone is not fully anon is a plus point, but that counts into the trust part :slight_smile:

1 Like
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This proposal seems well-intentioned, and generally a good idea, but seems like it should be revised to incorporate some of the feedback. I like it in theory, but for now, I’m a “no” until it is redrafted.

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Not sure having to get only 4 signers out of 7 on board really makes it safe enough. I prefer 5/7
The other issue is I think having 7 signatories rotated out every year ends up being a lot of work/time spent over the course of the year constantly figuring out who will replace. I think that’s too much time spent constantly figuring out who will replace who

So I’m for increasing the signatories but not in the current proposal

15

Perfect suggestion; 5/7.

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So we approve this proposal (Currently around 95% yes) and then can create a new proposal to add these suggestions?